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A Proposal for Early Impact,
Persistent, and Cost-Effective
Job Creation Policies
D
ue to the recession, the U.S.
economy has lost over 10 million jobs.
Job creation rarely receives the focus
it deserves in fiscal stimulus proposals,
either in the one that has already been
enacted or in many of the proposals
currently being considered.
Job creation deserves greater focus
because joblessness has large long-run
economic costs. Because conventional
fiscal stimulus does not focus on
job creation—job creation is only a
byproduct of boosting gross domestic
product (GDP)—this fiscal stimulus
is relatively costly per job created. As
a result, current and proposed fiscal
stimulus cannot create enough jobs at
politically acceptable costs to meet the
current job needs in the United States. If
we are to sufficiently address these needs
without overly adding to the budget
deficit, we need to make job creation
a central goal of a new fiscal stimulus
package. This package must have a low
cost per job created, address near-term
job needs, and have persistent effects
over the next several years.
Why Creating Jobs Is as Important as
Generating GDP
Much of the debate over fiscal
stimulus focuses on GDP multiplier
effects. The number of jobs created
receives less attention.

Job creation deserves special focus
because of the enormous costs of
joblessness in the long run. Joblessness
erodes the unemployed’s self-confidence
and job skills, and damages their
reputations with employers. Lengthy
unemployment reduces a worker’s
employment rates and wage rates in
the long run.1 Therefore, combating the
recession should place a great emphasis
on creating jobs, not just on boosting
GDP. The long-run productivity of
many workers and the economy will be
enhanced by antirecession policies that
stress job creation, even if they do not
have greater effects on GDP.

The Need for Immediate and Persistent
Job Creation Policies
If joblessness damages long-run
economic prospects, then the current
recession is a disaster with long-run
consequences. Losing millions of jobs
not only imposes current pain, it also
damages long-run economic productivity.
Since the start of the recession in
December 2007, the employment-topopulation ratio has dropped from 62.7
percent to 58.2 percent (as of December
2009). To restore employment conditions
to prerecession levels, the economy
would need an additional 10.7 million
jobs.
Even though GDP has begun to
recover, the labor market will likely have
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large employment deficits for the next
several years. In the last two recessions,
employment-to-population rates did not
increase from their trough level by more
than 0.2 percent for more than two and a
half years after the recovery in GDP had
begun. If our current recovery in GDP
began in mid-2009, history suggests that
the employment-to-population ratio will
not rise significantly above its current
level until the beginning of 2012. One
study finds that the U.S. economy will
be short of 2007 employment rates by
10.7 million jobs in 2010, 8.5 million
jobs in 2011, and 5.1 million jobs in 2012
(Schmitt and Baker 2009). Other analysts
project that it will be seven years before
unemployment rates dip below 5 percent
(Baily 2009; Thoma 2009).
These employment deficits are
occurring despite the $787 billion fiscal
stimulus package passed in February
2009. The stimulus package is helping,
but it is insufficient. Estimates from the
Council of Economic Advisers (2009a,
2010) suggest that the stimulus has added
over 1.5 million jobs so far and that it
may add another 2 million jobs by the
end of 2010. But the employment deficit
numbers given above are after these job
creation effects. Without the stimulus, we
would be short even more jobs.
Targeted Job Creation Policies
Are More Cost-Effective Than
Conventional Fiscal Stimulus Policies
These large employment deficits are
difficult to reduce through conventional
fiscal stimulus, which focuses on reviving
demand for goods and services through
tax cuts or increased public spending.
Job creation is a by-product of reviving
demand. More targeted job creation
policies, which directly increase jobs
relative to GDP, are much less costly per
job.
In the $787 billion fiscal stimulus
package, the average cost of creating
one job per year was $112,000. Tax cuts
are estimated to cost $145,000 per job
created, state fiscal relief is estimated to
cost $117,000 per job created, and direct
federal government spending is estimated
to cost $92,000 per job created (Council
of Economic Advisers 2009a). The “Cash
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for Clunkers” program has an estimated
cost per job created of $86,000 (Council
of Economic Advisers 2009b). “Cash
for Caulkers” is estimated to have a cost
per job created of $80,000 (Hendricks
et al. 2009). Increases in unemployment
benefits have an estimated cost per job
created of around $95,000.2
With costs of about $100,000 per
job created, it is difficult to have a
conventional fiscal stimulus package
large enough to significantly reduce
our employment deficits.3 Suppose
we wanted to create 5 million jobs in
2010 and 4 million jobs in 2011, which
would address a little less than half of
the expected employment deficits in
those years. At a cost per job created of
$100,000, the fiscal stimulus package
necessary to reach these job goals would
total another $900 billion. But the new
fiscal stimulus/job creation packages that
are thought to be currently politically

The current and proposed
fiscal stimulus plans cannot
create enough jobs at
politically acceptable costs
to meet the current job
needs in the United States.
feasible are much smaller. For example,
in December 2009 the U.S. House of
Representatives passed by only five
votes a $154 billion jobs/fiscal stimulus
package. Perhaps a bigger stimulus
package can be considered, but a package
close to the size of the original stimulus
seems politically implausible.
Targeted job creation policies are more
cost-effective than conventional fiscal
stimulus because these targeted policies
encourage employers to increase the ratio
of jobs to GDP. Targeted job creation
policies are around three times as costeffective as conventional fiscal stimulus:
$35,000 per job versus $100,000. The
recent Job Creation Tax Credit proposal,
which would provide employers with a
wage subsidy for payroll expansions, has
a gross cost per job created of $29,000
(Bartik and Bishop 2009). One public
service jobs program, the Minnesota
Emergency Employment Development
program (MEED), has a gross cost per

job created of $34,000 (Bartik 2009).
Other public service jobs proposals have
a gross cost per job created of $40,000
(Economic Policy Institute 2009). Finally,
“work sharing” proposals (Abraham
and Houseman 2009), which encourage
employers to reduce working hours rather
than lay off workers, have a gross cost
per job saved of $32,000 (Baker 2009).
The net costs of job creation programs
will be reduced because more jobs and
greater GDP will increase tax revenues
and reduce social spending. Targeted
job creation proposals may have fiscal
benefits of about $20,000 per job created
(Bartik and Bishop 2009), which reduces
the net cost to about $15,000 per job
created. Due to larger effects on GDP,
conventional fiscal stimulus will have
larger fiscal benefits: $40,000 per job
created.4 Net costs of conventional fiscal
stimulus per job created will then be
around $60,000, but targeted job creation
is still four times as effective in creating
jobs, per dollar of net costs.
Options for a Job Creation Package
A possible stimulus package targeted
only at job creation could include three
components: 1) tax credits for employers
creating jobs, 2) payments to employers
for work sharing, and 3) public service
job creation (see Table 1). This package
would aim to create 5 million jobs in
2010 and 4 million jobs in 2011, filling a
little less than half of the expected jobs
deficit in each year. The gross cost of
this package, as counted by the Office
of Management and Budget and the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO),
would be $276 billion, with a little over
half of that for 2010. However, after
accounting for the package’s effects in
increasing tax revenue and reducing
social spending, the net cost of this twoyear package would be only $108 billion.
The gross cost per job created is around
$30,000; the net cost is about $12,000.
Compared to the original fiscal
stimulus of $787 billion, this job creation
stimulus would have a gross cost only
one-third as much. However, it would
create 9 million “job-years” (5 million
in 2010, 4 million in 2011)—about
one-third greater than the original fiscal
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creation policies should be a major part
of any new fiscal stimulus package.

Table 1 A Possible Jobs Package
Year

Job creation
tax credit

2010
2011
Two-year total

2.8
2.3
5.1

1.3
0.7
2.0

0.9
1.0
1.9

5.0
4.0
9.0

Gross costs ($, billions)

2010
2011
Two-year total

80
67
147

43
21
64

31
34
65

154
122
276

Net costs ($, billions)

2010
2011
Two-year total

13
14
27

30
15
45

17
19
36

60
48
108

Effect analyzed
Jobs created (millions)

Job sharing Public service
tax credit
employment

Total

NOTE: Gross costs are costs as counted by budget agencies, without allowing for any effects of
programs on job creation and GDP generation. Net costs allow for estimated increases in jobs
and GDP and resulting effects on tax revenue and social spending.
SOURCE: Estimated effects for the Job Creation Tax Credit are from Bartik and Bishop (2009);
for work sharing, Baker (2009); for public service jobs programs, my unpublished estimates for
MEED (see Bartik [2009] and references therein).

stimulus’s estimated effect of creating 6.8
million “job-years.” (One job created for
one year is one “job-year.”) About half
of the package would be a tax credit for
employers adding to payroll, one-quarter
would go to subsidies encouraging
employers to offer work sharing, and
one-quarter would go to the creation of
public service jobs.
Tax credits for job creation and
subsidies for work sharing could very
quickly be put into effect. And contrary
to some comments (McArdle 2009),
it is feasible to expand public service
jobs quite quickly to the 1.1 million
job slots of this package.5 During the
Great Depression, the Civil Works
Administration created 4.3 million jobs
in two months, and the Works Progress
Administration created 2.7 million
jobs within eight months (Kesselman
1978; Howard 1943). More recently,
in 1983 MEED created the equivalent
nationally of 500,000 jobs within six
months.6 Rapid public service job
creation is quite feasible if government
administrators are given strong
incentives to reach job creation goals in
a timely fashion.
What if policymakers want fiscal
stimulus to also achieve other goals in
addition to job creation? For example,
they may also want to extend access
to unemployment benefits or maintain
state and local public services. A fiscal

stimulus package can also achieve
these goals, but only at higher costs
or some sacrifice of job creation. We
could add $100 billion to the package
in conventional fiscal stimulus, which
at $100,000 per job would create about
1 million jobs. We could then still
create 9 million jobs if we reduced job
creation stimulus to $246 billion. The
fiscal stimulus package would then have
to be $346 billion to achieve the same
job creation goals. Alternatively, we

Targeted job creation policies
are around three times as
cost effective as conventional
fiscal stimulus: $35,000
per job versus $100,000.
could keep the overall package at $276
billion by letting the $100 billion in
conventional fiscal stimulus replace $100
billion in targeted job creation stimulus.
But then the package’s job creation
would be lowered from 9 million jobs to
6.7 million jobs.
Policymakers must decide the
importance of job creation versus other
goals of fiscal stimulus. If it is important
to create a significant number of jobs at
politically feasible costs—and economic
research suggests that short-term job
creation is important to long-term
economic prospects—then targeted job

Notes
1. The long-run loss of earnings due to
unemployment is at least one-fifth of the
short-run effects. For example, displaced
workers suffer a 25 percent loss of earnings
in the year of displacement. Ten years later,
displaced workers still suffer a 6 percent
earnings loss (Stevens 1997). As another
example, graduating from college in a year
with 1 percent higher unemployment initially
reduces the graduate’s wages by 6 percent.
Fifteen years later, these unlucky graduates’
wages are still 2.5 percent lower (Kahn
forthcoming). As a final example, when state
employment declines, about two-thirds of the
drop is reflected initially in state residents
having a lower employment-to-population
ratio (one-third is reflected in lower state
population). After 17 years, the employmentto-population ratio in the state is still lower,
by about 25 percent of the initial shock to
employment (Bartik, 2001, pp. 141–145).
2. This is based on taking the midpoint
of the CBO’s November 2009 estimates
that such transfer payments have a GDP
multiplier somewhere between 0.8 and 2.2. I
also use the Council of Economic Advisers’
estimates (2009a) that a 1 percent increase
in GDP is needed to induce 1 million new
jobs. At current GDP levels of $14.2 trillion,
this implies a GDP per job created figure of
$142,000. Dividing by 1.5 yields $95,000.
3. The reason conventional fiscal stimulus
measures cost $100,000 per job created can
be explained intuitively: they only indirectly
boost job creation by increasing output
demand. Suppose one dollar of fiscal stimulus
increases demand for GDP by one dollar (a
multiplier of 1.0), and that a boost to GDP
increased job creation by the average ratio of
GDP to jobs, which is $105,000 (Council of
Economic Advisers 2009a). Then the cost per
job created of conventional fiscal stimulus
would be $105,000. Some conventional
fiscal stimulus may have multipliers greater
than 1, which would lower the cost per job
created. But boosts to GDP during a recession
may raise GDP by a greater percentage than
employment by increasing weekly work hours
and worker productivity per hour. Even with
fiscal multipliers of 1.5, it is difficult for the
cost per job created to be much less than
$100,000.
4. Based on CBO data, Bartik and Bishop
(2009) estimate fiscal benefits of 38 percent of
the GDP boost. If conventional fiscal stimulus
has a GDP-to-job created ratio of $105,000,
then fiscal benefits per job created will be 38
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percent of $105,000, which is around $40,000.
Targeted job creation proposals have lower
effects on GDP per job created, which reduces
their fiscal benefits to around $20,000 per job.
5. To create 0.9 million jobs through public
service jobs requires somewhat more job
slots. The model assumes some substitution
of public service job slots for jobs that would
have been created anyway, as well as some
multiplier effects of this spending for public
service jobs.
6. Personal communication between the
author and former MEED administrators.
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